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Greece: Papandreou and the Military

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An Intelligence Assessment

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April 1983

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This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of European Analysis. [redacted]

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Key Judgments*Information available
as of 1 April 1983
was used in this report.*

The election of Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister in October 1981 was a source of deep concern to the Greek officer corps, which is politically conservative, staunchly pro-West, and heir to a long tradition of intervention in politics. Keenly aware of military concerns, Papandreou as Prime Minister has placed a high priority on reassuring officers that he is not a reckless ideologue but a pragmatist who will work vigorously for Greek interests. We believe his performance in office thus far has left the majority of active duty officers content to remain in the barracks—nursing a reputation badly bruised during the 1967-74 dictatorship, rebuilding military capabilities, and focusing attention on the perceived Turkish threat.

After his election, Papandreou assumed the defense portfolio and appointed a highly regarded former officer as one of his deputy defense ministers—moves designed both to assuage military sensitivities and to caution against “political activity” within the officer corps. In general he has respected normal retirement and promotion patterns and has selected well-qualified professionals for the top military posts. In addition, Papandreou has kept defense spending high and increased pay and benefits for officers and enlisted men—important signals to a military that sometimes has moved against the government partly for bread-and-butter reasons.

More importantly, in our judgment the majority of active duty officers are relieved by Papandreou’s handling of foreign policy thus far. We believe the military will tolerate his hardline tactics vis-a-vis NATO and the United States in the hope of gaining additional assistance, provided these tactics do not point to withdrawal from NATO or severance of the bilateral security relationship with the United States—

Despite their strong commitment to the West, however, many military officers continue to harbor resentment toward NATO and the United States for failing to stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In short, the military is above all else strongly nationalistic, and its pro-Western views have not prevented it from backing a tough stand in the current US base talks. Moreover, Papandreou’s call for a Western security guarantee against Turkey and a balance of power in the Aegean reflects, in our judgment, the concerns of the majority of military men, who since 1974 have considered Turkey the primary threat to Greek national interests. The views of Papandreou, politicians, and military men converge to a greater degree on the Turkish issue than on any other.

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
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Ultimately, the “depoliticization” of the military will depend, in our opinion, on the political environment within Greece itself—the development of strong democratic institutions, the commitment of both civilian and military leaders to work within the system, and a general belief in the fairness of the political process. Although many problems remain, the Greek political system appears to be evolving gradually toward a pattern more closely resembling the West European norm. This trend, if it continues over the long run, will be the surest guarantee against the praetorian politics so prevalent in the past.



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Greece: Papandreou and the Military

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
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Andreas Papandreou's victory in the national election 18 months ago caused concern among Greek officers, most of whom probably had hoped for the reelection of the conservative New Democracy Party. The military—which has a long tradition of intervening in politics—had long worried about the growing popularity of Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), and the Prime Minister's fiery preelection rhetoric served only to increase its misgivings. Papandreou and the military seem to have worked out a *modus vivendi* in the intervening months. On balance, we believe the Prime Minister's performance in office has tended to allay military fears—although many in the officer corps will continue to remain uneasy about Papandreou and his long-range aims.

A Pattern of Intervention

The Greek officer corps traditionally has viewed itself as the guardian of "national honor and ideals"—a mandate it has interpreted broadly to include vigilance against domestic as well as foreign enemies. In the 19th century the Greek military acted as a liberalizing force. The officer corps and the political elite shared the same social background and values, and the two generally worked in concert to initiate change. However, politicians and military officers began to diverge socially and culturally early in the 20th century. The 1909 "Goudi revolt" by junior and noncommissioned officers who were not members of the traditional elite set in motion a pattern of military intervention that was to characterize Greek politics for the next six decades. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the coup d'état became the normal means of transferring power, as liberal and royalist factions within the officer corps—together with their political patrons—vied for control of the government. Each new regime purged the military and elevated or reinstated officers loyal to its goals.

The accession to office of a royalist general, Ioannis Metaxas, who headed the government from 1936 until his death in 1941, ushered in a period of relatively stable military rule. The outbreak of World War II drew the politically active military back into the



Prime Minister Papandreou

Sygma ©

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barracks and put an end to much of the earlier factionalism by uniting the military against a common external enemy. During and after World War II and the Greek Civil War, the military began developing into a relatively cohesive force, taking on much of the conservative and pro-Western coloration that still characterizes it today.¹ At the same time, it retained its role as a vibrant extraparlimentary force, in part because of the weakness of the civilian governments: between 1946 and 1952 some 16 different civilian administrations ruled Greece.

¹ During the 1950s Greece solidified its commitment to the West and NATO—a move given impetus by the vast amounts of American economic and military aid entering Greece in the postwar years. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in early 1953 concluded a base agreement with the United States that is still in effect. The military benefited in particular from Western aid and training.

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By the early 1960s, friction between military and political elites began to resurface. Greek political culture was shifting away from the strong antileftism of the 1950s, and left-of-center politicians were gaining a degree of popular acceptance. These changes, however, were not reflected in the military, which tended to view the rise of the center-left as a threat to its security—and, by extension, the security of the nation. [redacted]

The growing divergence between military and civilian leaders culminated in the coup d'état of 21 April 1967. In order to head off an election victory by liberal politician George Papandreou—Andreas's father—some 20 middle-grade Army officers took control of the government.² The colonels involved claimed their action was necessary to "save the nation" from chaos and Communism. However, the fear of personal setbacks—most ran the risk of being retired from service in the event of an election victory by the elder Papandreou—and grievances over pay and benefits also figured prominently in the decision to intervene. A countercoup attempt by the King and royalist generals in December failed, and the King went into exile. [redacted]

The colonels carried out an extensive purge of the military and civilian bureaucracies, removing not only those suspected of harboring liberal or leftist sentiments but also those identified as royalists. Approximately 600 officers were dismissed from active duty in the first year after the takeover. During their seven years in power, the colonels were accused of using torture and other forms of brutality against their political opponents; they—and consequently the military in general—acquired a repressive image in the eyes of many Greeks. Attempts to liberalize came too late, and the regime found itself the target of growing

² George Papandreou had previously resigned as Prime Minister in mid-1965 in a controversy involving his son Andreas. The younger Papandreou was accused of conspiring with a small clandestine group of leftwing officers known as ASPIDA (Shield), but the charge was never proved. The King blocked efforts by George Papandreou to make changes in the military hierarchy and dismiss his Minister of Defense, who had been tasked with investigating the group. The elder Papandreou resigned as a result, and the country lapsed into two years of economic and political instability under a caretaker government. [redacted]

public opposition.³ In July 1974 the junta backed an ill-fated coup on Cyprus which prompted a Turkish invasion of the island. Militarily, Athens was not equipped to respond to the Turkish move—seven years of wielding political power had eroded the combat readiness and professionalism of the military. A group of officers in northern Greece refused to answer the junta's orders to mobilize, successfully demanding instead the resignation of its leaders and their replacement by civilian politicians. [redacted]

Depoliticizing the Military

When Constantine Karamanlis was invited out of self-imposed exile in 1974 to head the new government of national unity, he faced an exceedingly fragile situation.⁴ Although the military had relinquished power, junta supporters remained in key positions. Moreover, Greece faced a potential war with Turkey, and the need to maintain morale within the officer corps precluded an extensive shakeup of the armed services. On the other hand, there was intense public pressure for the systematic dismissal of those who had supported and cooperated with the junta. [redacted]

Karamanlis moved swiftly but cautiously to consolidate civilian control over the government and the armed services. He also attempted to lay to rest the two issues that in the past had caused the deepest and most bitter divisions within Greece and had encouraged the politicization of the military. He scheduled a referendum in which voters rejected the monarchy, and he legalized the Communist Party—thus making the Communists seem less of a threat by bringing their opposition into the open. [redacted]

Seeking to minimize the trauma to the officer corps, Karamanlis punished only the top leaders of the junta and deflected blame away from the military in general. Ultimately, only about 50 officers were convicted

³ In November 1973 the gradual buildup of anti-junta sentiments culminated in clashes between students and military police that led to the deaths of several students and marked the beginning of the end for the military regime. Subsequently, George Papadopoulos, the original leader of the 1967 coup, was unseated in an Army-backed countercoup led by Dimitrios Ioannides, the head of the military police. [redacted]

⁴ Karamanlis, a conservative politician, had served as Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963. [redacted]

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
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
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of crimes related to the 1967 military takeover and subsequent events. Another 200 officers were dismissed from service, but most of those whom the government distrusted were simply assigned to non-sensitive posts or retired during the normal promotion cycle. [redacted]



As Prime Minister, Karamanlis left his mark on the military not only through his firm insistence on civilian control but also through his efforts to build up defense capabilities and foster a sense of professionalism within the officer corps. The military clearly benefited from many of the changes he introduced. Defense spending, for example, generally exceeded previous levels. [redacted] the defense budget in 1977 was equal to about 27 percent of the national budget and 7 percent of the GDP—a significant increase from the early 1970s (see table 2 on Defense Effort). In early 1977, Greece began serious development of a domestic arms industry and as a first step provided for construction of an aircraft maintenance facility at Tanagra. That same year, women were admitted to service for the first time. [redacted]

Parliament also passed a bill in 1977 restructuring the armed services. The new structure provided for decentralizing command authority within the general staff and rotating the position of chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) among the three services. In theory the proposed rotation of the



Prime Minister Papandreou almost certainly consults President Karamanlis on issues of special concern to the military. [redacted]

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top military post reduced the role of the Army, which traditionally had overshadowed the two smaller branches. Out of deference to the size and political clout of the Army, however, neither Karamanlis nor George Rallis—his successor as Prime Minister—broke with the tradition of naming Army officers as chief of HNDGS. In addition, civilian control over the military was strengthened by the establishment of the Supreme National Defense Council—made up of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the HNDGS, and selected Cabinet officials.⁶ The Council was given

⁶ In July 1982, the Papandreou government established the Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA) as part of a larger restructuring of the Cabinet. KYSEA—made up of the Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Public Order; and the Deputy Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs—replaces the Supreme National Defense Council. [redacted]

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responsibility for setting national security policy and ultimately approving all promotions, retirements, and assignments. [redacted]

Papandreou's Approach

Papandreou began to moderate his radical rhetoric and to court centrist elements in both the electorate and the military as early as 1977—after the parliamentary election in which the Socialists became the major opposition party. During his election campaign, Papandreou showed a keen sensitivity to the practical issues that affect the officer corps and that in part have triggered past military interventions. Many of his promised military reforms—especially regarding pay and benefits—were designed to appeal to the officers. In addition, the strongly nationalistic military found his stand against negotiations with Turkey compatible with its own views. However, Papandreou's demands for the "dejuntification" of the armed services, withdrawal from NATO, and removal of US bases continued to cause considerable concern within the officer corps. [redacted]

Since his election, Papandreou has moved swiftly to try to ease concerns within the military.⁷ He assumed the post of Defense Minister himself, and press accounts reveal that he devotes a significant amount of time to addressing military audiences and attending military functions. He has surrounded himself with highly regarded military advisers who, for the most part, are apolitical. He also has affirmed his intention to keep defense spending up and has followed through on his promise to increase pay and benefits—even though this has added considerably to the already overburdened budget. [redacted]

The Key Issues

Most officers probably would give Papandreou a mixed rating in his performance thus far. There is [redacted]

every reason to believe the officer corps approves certain of Papandreou's decisions, particularly those to increase military benefits and to adopt a tough line with Turkey. At the same time, it tolerates—and probably will continue to tolerate—the Prime Minister's tactics toward US base negotiations and Greece's relations with NATO, as long as his actions do not significantly damage security relations with the West. On issues that could affect the composition and orientation of the military, however, we believe the officer corps will continue to be suspicious and nervous—especially if it perceives increasing leftist influence in the armed services. So far, Papandreou has remained within the bounds of acceptable action tacitly set by the military. [redacted]

We believe, nonetheless, that the military will continue to watch Papandreou's performance more closely than that of his immediate predecessors. Embassy, [redacted] reporting indicate that most officers remain uncertain of the Prime Minister's ultimate aims. [redacted]

Promotions and Retirements.

[redacted] some critics of the Papandreou regime have been disturbed at what they view as the large number of changes in the senior ranks of the officer corps since the Socialists came to power. Consequently, they have accused the government of making personnel changes in the armed forces on the basis of political rather than professional criteria. Indeed, shortly after assuming office, Papandreou replaced all his service chiefs and much of his general staff. He also retired approximately 131 colonels last year—one-fourth to one-third of the total in the ground forces. [redacted]

Under the Greek system, however, a high level of turnover is normal. The moderate conservative opposition newspaper *Kathimerini*, one of the more reliable Greek papers, has noted, for example, that the number of personnel changes last year was "impressive"

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The Officer Corps: Continuity and Change

Years of intervention in politics, the legacy of the junta period, and the reforms of the Karamanlis era have all contributed to the complex character of the officer corps which Papandreou has inherited. The officers with whom he must deal form an important sociopolitical interest group—sharing a conservative world view, a common social background, and collective professional concerns. Selective recruitment and history have nurtured conservative views. Many currently active duty senior officers grew up during the Metaxas era and experienced combat during World War II and the Civil War. During the period from 1950 to 1974, officers with liberal or leftist sympathies were systematically eliminated from the military and kept out of the service academies. Despite his removal of many former junta supporters, Karamanlis did not fundamentally change the recruitment system or alter the conservative complexion of the armed services. To this day military education fosters strong anti-Communist sentiments, a basic distrust of the left, and a wariness of politicians.

The social composition of the officer corps also contributes to the conservative political and social attitudes of the military. Since the early part of the century, a military career has attracted primarily young men from rural areas and small towns. According to academic studies from the early and mid-1970s, a high proportion of officer school candidates—most of whom presumably are now company or field grade officers—come from the poorer areas of Greece such as Macedonia and the Peloponnesus. The fathers of most are farmers or tradesmen. The only exceptions are naval officers, about two-thirds of whom come from urban, middle and upper class families. The social profile of new cadets in all three service branches, according to these studies, had changed little from the previous two decades. In

contrast, the civilian political elite is drawn primarily from the urban, educated, and upper middle class stratum of society. This divergence in social background has grown wider in the last two decades and has contributed to the tension between civilian and military leaders.

Officers tend to cast their mission in almost sacred terms—a tendency upon which politicians often play when seeking to rouse national spirit. Papandreou himself, in various speeches, has referred to the officer as “not only a mere citizen but a citizen entrusted with a holy task.” In the past, officers sometimes interpreted their mandate to protect Greece’s national security and territorial integrity very broadly. Alleged internal threats from the political left—which was often blamed for the “moral and social decay” of the country—were used to justify military intervention. In fact, however, disputes over bread-and-butter issues sometimes were of greater significance

Since 1974, a certain ambivalence has characterized the military’s perceptions of its role, its attitudes toward civilian government, and its relations with Western allies. The Greek electorate has undergone a gradual shift to the left, and, although, the officer corps retains its conservative character, we believe it, too, has been affected by changing political and social currents. The West European model of the professional soldier gradually has begun to overlay earlier, more colorful self-images of military virtues and ideals. A staunch commitment to the West has been tempered by disappointment at a perceived tilt by NATO and the United States toward Turkey in recent years. Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the military is still recovering from the negative image it acquired during the 1967-74 period.

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Table 1
Army Retirements ^a

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 ^b
Total	135	141	152	138	189	152
Lieutenant General	5	3	4	4	8	4
Major General	10	12	12	12	16	17
Brigadier General	21	24	30	26	34	31
Colonel	99	102	106	96	131	100

^a In Greece, the promotion-retirement system is based on time in grade and on seniority, which is calculated according to years in service and class standing. When an officer is promoted, all officers senior to him in that same service must be either promoted or retired. Because competition at the top is especially intense, as many as one-third or more colonels and generals are normally retired in a given year; thus, it is not unusual for the entire senior-level staff to be replaced every two or three years.

^b These figures represent the total retirements in these categories for 1983.

Source: *Kathimerini*, 10 March 1983, from information provided by the Ministry of Defense.

but "not much different" from past years.⁸ This is supported by data released by the Ministry of Defense last month (see table 1).

To fill the top military slots, Papandreou—like his predecessors—used the established selection system to promote officers whose records indicated they were at least neutral toward his government.⁹ His choices for the most part were well-respected professionals who had risen through the ranks under the watchful eyes of previous administrations. The track record of his general staff officers indicates that they are strong anti-Communists who are firmly committed to the Western alliance.

Under the 1977 law that restructured the armed services, Papandreou was able to appoint a naval officer for the first time as chief of the Hellenic

⁸ *Kathimerini* reflects opposition views generally in line with the New Democracy Party, and thus its assessment of the review cycle is significant.

National Defense General Staff. He also was able to position General Kouris, the Air Force Chief of Staff and a particular favorite of his, to ascend eventually to the post. So far, Papandreou has faced only one major personnel crisis. His Navy Chief of Staff resigned last year after three months in the position in a dispute over the control of assignments, and the Prime Minister passed over three senior naval officers—thereby forcing their retirement—to appoint a relatively unseasoned officer, Nikolaos Pappas, to the top Navy post.¹⁰ The decision prompted criticism in the conservative press

Despite these changes, we believe appointments and promotions so far—while prompting some grumbling in the ranks—have not provoked any serious dissatisfaction within the officer corps or among respected conservative politicians. In fact, according to Embassy reporting, former Defense Minister Averoff—currently leader of the conservative opposition—remarked, after general staff changes were announced early last year, that he was not disturbed by the command changes and that he believed the new chiefs of staff would serve national rather than party interests.

We believe Papandreou is aware of the sensitivity of the promotion-retirement issue, and therefore we expect fewer changes during the 1983 cycle. So far this year Papandreou has not made any changes in his chiefs of staff, and the number of senior-level retirements announced last month does not appear excessive, given the pool of eligible candidates for promotion and the lack of headroom. Senior-level personnel action is normally effected in March, and we have no reason to believe that the announced retirements were connected to recent rumors of coup plotting activity.

¹⁰ Under Greek law the chiefs of staff recommend promotions, retirements, and assignments to the Ministry of Defense, which in turn submits them for approval to the Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense. On occasion, the Council may overrule the recommendations.

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[REDACTED]

Benefits and Pay. Papandreou has tried to win the confidence of the military by introducing a package of benefits that, although modest, has almost certainly boosted morale while improving the living conditions of both officers and enlisted personnel. The government instituted housing allowances for officers early last year that range from \$50 to \$170 per month, with quarterly cost-of-living adjustments depending on marital status, rank, and years of service. It also began an investigation of the Officers' Autonomous Housing Organization to discover why it had helped only 4,185 out of 15,962 officers locate quarters. Shortly thereafter the government also began providing medical benefits—including hospital, maternity, and dental care—for immediate relatives of recruits who were not covered under any other insurance program. [REDACTED]

Last July a new pay scale for enlisted men went into effect. Single soldiers now receive from \$7 to \$13 monthly, depending on their rank, while their married counterparts earn from \$44 to \$111, depending on number of children. Although military pay is still low—forcing recruits to depend on help from their families—the press reported that the new pay scale represented a 500-percent increase and added approximately \$17.5 million to the 1982 budget. Other programs to upgrade the quality of life in the military are likely to follow. The government, for example, wants to expand and encourage university-level educational opportunities for officers and enlisted men. [REDACTED]

Recruitment. Since coming to power, Papandreou has had to balance the demands of the left for “democratization” of the armed forces against tacit pressures from the officer corps to preserve its conservative identity. The Prime Minister’s actions so far suggest that he will follow an incremental, go-slow approach—especially on the sensitive question of recruitment. [REDACTED]

Under the colonels’ regime entrance to the military academies was strictly controlled, and only recruits judged to be “politically reliable” were admitted. The Karamanlis government made some changes in recruitment procedures after 1974 to screen out extreme rightists. [REDACTED]

The Papandreou government has begun implementing changes in these procedures that would open up military academies to a more politically diversified group of recruits. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A parliamentary amendment passed last September increases the size of entering classes. Children of officers and enlisted men killed in the line of duty and children and brothers of disabled war veterans are now admitted on the basis of high school performance, rather than an entrance examination. The press also reports that background activity investigations are no longer supposed to be used in screening applicants to the academies. [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

Officers nonetheless are worried by the efforts of radical leftists to enter the military academies. Less well-known members of the Communist Party, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Last October several senior cadets were reprimanded for hazing a freshman recruit who allegedly was a Communist. Such incidents, if they continue, are likely to cause considerable uneasiness among officers. [redacted]

Based on the measures adopted so far, it is clear that Papandreou wants to open up academies to members of his own party, but at the same time keep out the Communists—in part because they are his staunchest domestic opponents and in part because their entry would create a backlash on the right. Papandreou's room for maneuver in balancing the demands of the left and the concerns of the right on recruitment policy is especially narrow. [redacted]

Reorganization of the National Guard. In September Parliament passed a bill reorganizing and reducing the size of the Battalions of National Defense (TEA), which had come to be closely identified with the discredited policies of the 1967-74 military junta. The new law, which renamed the organization the Greek National Guard, calls for a manpower reduction of 10 percent in border and island areas and 70 to 90 percent in the interior. [redacted]

[redacted] this will eliminate about one-third of the 85,000 men who currently serve in the battalions. In addition, approximately 150 of the 810 regular military officers assigned to the TEA are to be transferred to combat units. [redacted]

Although the reorganization of the TEA initially received criticism in the conservative press, the changes were not as extensive as Papandreou's critics had feared. We doubt that the changes caused serious

concern among conservatives, either in political or military circles. In fact, in the end the conservative New Democracy Party voted for the government-sponsored bill. [redacted]

Defense Priorities. Like the Karamanlis and Rallis administrations, the Papandreou government continues to emphasize defense spending to maintain a balance of power in the Aegean; expansion of the domestic defense industry, including licensing and coproduction arrangements with foreign firms; increased self-sufficiency in spare parts; and diversification of arms sources. Last year, [redacted]

[redacted] military expenditures equaled about 21 percent of Greece's total budget and almost 7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), up significantly from the early 1970s. [redacted]

The defense burden, however, gradually has become more onerous because of the slower economic growth, higher inflation, and larger current account deficits in the last two to three years. Although military expenditures have placed a strain on the budget and diverted funds from social programs, Papandreou has promised the military that he will not cut defense spending. Given the current tensions with Turkey, the public supports this policy. [redacted]

Like successive governments since 1974, the Papandreou government wants to develop a domestic defense industry in order to conserve foreign exchange over the long term and reduce dependence on the United States. The government also hopes to diversify Greece's sources of weaponry, and since early last year it has been evaluating and discussing potential defense industrial cooperation arrangements and equipment purchases. [redacted]

¹² In April 1982 Greece signed a general five-year defense agreement with France that, while vague, opens the way for cooperation in arms supply and in design and manufacturing. A trip by the Deputy Defense Minister to West Germany in early May resulted in an agreement for the joint production of Leopard tanks. At present, Greece is actively pursuing the purchase of modern aircraft. [redacted]

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Table 2
Defense Effort, 1973-82

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 ^a
GDP (billion US \$)	16.3	18.8	20.8	22.6	26.2	31.7	38.5	40.1	36.7	39.9
Defense expenditures (million US \$)	674.8	1,050.0	1,422.8	1,557.3	1,838.5	2,124.5	2,420.4	2,275.5	2,578.4	2,745.4
Of which:										
Equipment ^b (percent)	9.4	12.7	20.5	20.3	20.3	18.1	17.7	18.8	20.5	19.1
Construction ^c (percent)	7.1	4.5	6.1	5.3	6.4	5.2	4.0	2.8	2.6	2.5
Pay and allowances ^d (percent)	38.1	41.7	34.2	32.4	33.0	34.1	36.0	35.5	33.6	35.7
Other operating expenses (percent)	45.4	41.1	39.2	42.0	40.3	42.6	42.3	42.8	43.3	42.7
Defense expenditures as percent of GDP	4.1	5.6	6.8	6.9	7.0	6.7	6.3	5.7	7.0	6.9
Total budget expenditure (billion US \$)	3.5	4.3	5.3	5.8	6.7	8.2	10.1	9.9	11.1	12.9
Defense expenditures as percent of budget expenditures	19.3	24.7	27.1	26.9	27.3	26.0	23.9	23.0	23.2	21.2
Population (millions)	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.8
Armed forces (military and civilian) (thousands)	209.5	212.4	212.5	214.8	215.5	215.7	215.9	210.7	212.7	211.2
Armed forces (military only) (thousands)	184.3	185.9	185.1	186.3	186.5	186.4	186.5	186.2	187.6	185.7
Military and civilian personnel as percent of labor force	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.0	6.0	5.9

^a Estimated.^b Major equipment and missiles.^c Includes NATO common infrastructures and national military construction.^d Military and civilian personnel.

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
Reporting from US Embassy [redacted] sources indicates that the military is satisfied with the government's defense budget and supports its emphasis on a domestic arms industry. It is more ambivalent, however, about efforts to diversify sources of supply. On the one hand, officers have expressed a decided preference for American equipment, and they worry that diversification would pose problems in terms of maintenance and logistics. [redacted]

[redacted] The military's reaction so far suggests that it would accept a government decision that points toward limited diversification. [redacted]

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Greek forces on parade during National Day celebrations, 25 March 1983.

Ethnos ©



Members of the Mountain Raiding Company, an elite special forces-type unit

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Relations With Turkey. In our judgment, Papan-dreu's hardline policy on Turkey and the Aegean, which differs more in tone than in substance from that of his predecessors, has struck a responsive chord among military officers. Since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the military has encouraged a tough stand on Turkish-Greek relations—a position bolstered by popular opinion, which, as reflected in press reporting, sees Turkey as a growing regional power with designs on Greek territory. Military concern over the Turkish threat was reflected in the post-1974 defense program, which emphasized rearmament and modernization of the Air Force and Navy. Greek forces were redeployed to face possible Turkish aggression in Thrace and the Aegean, and fortifications on the islands close to the Turkish coast were strengthened in response to the establishment of a Turkish "Aegean" army.

Greek fears stem primarily from what Athens views as Turkish attempts over the last eight years to redefine the "status quo" in the Aegean. Disputes center on continental shelf rights, the definition of territorial waters, airspace boundaries, militarization of the Greek islands, and NATO command and control responsibilities. After Greece's withdrawal from the military wing of NATO in 1974, Turkey began to press for a share in NATO command and control in the Aegean and also for an equal division of

seabed resources. Post-1974 Greek governments under Karamanlis and Rallis were willing to talk to Turkey about their differences, believing that negotiations minimized the risk of confrontation. Although the two sides remained far apart on fundamental issues, some progress was made. In early 1980 Turkey dropped its demands for control of civil air traffic over the eastern half of the Aegean; late in the year it agreed to postpone resolution of NATO command and control issues, thereby opening the way for Greek reentry into NATO. In return, Greece adjusted its air corridors to facilitate Turkish commercial traffic and eased some of its unilateral restrictions on military flights in the Aegean.

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"NATO Plan for Greek Reintegration," which, upon Greece's reentry in 1980, assigned command and control responsibility in the Aegean to NATO's Commander in Chief, South (CINCSOUTH), pending the resolution of disputes between Greece and Turkey. The military preferred instead the earlier Haig-Davos proposals, which would have allowed Athens to maintain command and control while discussions were held with Ankara on a new arrangement. It also opposed any concessions on airspace and air traffic control.

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The officer corps opposes any formula for joint control which, in effect, would give Turkey military responsibility for the security of some Greek islands. Greek military planners probably fear that such joint control could provide Turkey with a justification at some later date for a military move against one or more of the Greek islands. The military's rigid posture toward Turkey is tempered to some extent by the belief that an armed conflict between the two NATO allies would be mutually disastrous. [redacted]

We believe Papandreou is inclined to talk tough while trying to minimize the risk of conflict. Both Papandreou and the military probably would prefer to bide their time—maintaining tensions at a manageable level and putting off sensitive decisions that will require compromise. This artful procrastination will almost certainly become more difficult over time. In our opinion, the military ultimately could prove to be the greatest constraint on the Prime Minister's ability to negotiate a settlement on Aegean issues. [redacted]

The United States and NATO. [redacted]

The Greek military's support for close relations with the United States and NATO stem from a combination of emotional, ideological, and practical reasons:

- The United States helped reorganize the Greek armed services after World War II and lent support to forces fighting the Communists in the Civil War. Since 1946 Washington has committed about \$6.1 billion in military and economic aid to Greece. US and Western military aid also has poured in through NATO.

- Despite vacillations in public and government attitudes toward the United States and NATO, Greek officers have continued to work closely with their US counterparts. Many have received training in the United States. 25X1

- The armed forces are highly dependent on the United States for spare parts and maintenance. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of the Greek weapons inventory is of US origin. 25X1

- Notwithstanding the events of 1974, officers see membership in NATO and cooperation with the United States as among the most effective guarantees against Turkish aggression. 25X1

[redacted] Bowing to strong anti-American public sentiment, 25X1 post-1974 governments made an effort to reduce 25X1 military reliance on the United States while, at the same time, reaffirming their commitment to Western defense interests. Even during Karamanlis's tenure as Prime Minister, [redacted] the military was disturbed by many of the government's policies. In our opinion, it accepted Karamanlis's show of independence primarily because he was a politician with impeccable conservative credentials whose underlying commitment to the West was not in doubt. The military is less certain of Papandreou's ultimate goals and thus would probably be more disturbed if the current government moved far along the same path. [redacted] 25X1

So far, however, Papandreou has not interfered with day-to-day military relations between Greece and the United States. For example, US ships have been allowed to visit Greek ports more frequently than in the past. In September 1982 the Prime Minister

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responded positively to a US request to allow long-range reconnaissance flights out of Crete in support of the peacekeeping effort in Lebanon—in this case overruling the military. The US Embassy [redacted] relations between US officers and their Greek counterparts continue, in most cases, to be open and friendly. [redacted]

Papandreou also has moved away from his preelection demand for immediate dismantling of the US bases and instead has spoken of setting a timetable for their eventual removal. We believe this shift reflects, in part, the Prime Minister's growing awareness of the economic benefits—as well as the advantages to Greek defense—to be derived from the continued operation of the bases. We think it also reflects his sensitivity to the military's position. [redacted]

This does not mean, however, that either Papandreou or the military will be any less tough on specific points in the ongoing Greek-US negotiations. Last month, for example, the government signaled its displeasure over Washington's original FY 1984 military aid proposals for Greece and Turkey by threatening to suspend US reconnaissance flights from Hellenikon airbase. A preservation of the 7-to-10 aid ratio between Greece and Turkey has been a key Greek demand throughout the negotiations. The military's behavior during past base talks indicates that officers will encourage the government to set high demands, and we believe they will support Papandreou's limited pressure tactics. [redacted]

Although Greek-NATO relations have been more troubled under Papandreou than in the recent past, it appears that Papandreou has acted for the most part with the concurrence of his military advisers. Before pulling out of two NATO exercises in May 1982, withdrawing from a six-member exercise last November, and canceling participation in an annual NATO exercise this February, Papandreou almost certainly consulted with trusted military experts such as the Air

Force chief, General Kouris.¹⁴ The disappointment expressed by some senior Army field officers over the November withdrawal probably stemmed more from the last-minute nature of the cancellation and the loss of training experience than from differences with the government over the Turkish aspect of the issue. [redacted]

In our judgment, Greek officers view continued participation in NATO as vital to Greek interests but are willing to risk NATO disapproval to underscore their position on Aegean issues and prod the Alliance into a more active role in settling Greek-Turkish disputes. We suspect they are less happy with—but willing to accept—the Prime Minister's more aggressive approach on political issues in NATO forums as long as it does not significantly affect long-term security relations with the West. [redacted]

¹⁴ Athens withdrew from one of the exercises in May to protest continued Turkish violations of Greek-claimed airspace. It pulled out of maneuvers in November 1982 and February 1983 because NATO failed to respond positively to its request to include the island of Limnos as a target area in the exercise. Athens and Ankara dispute the legality of militarizing Limnos, and NATO generally has avoided involvement in the controversy by not including the area in maneuvers. [redacted]

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we see most trends in Greek politics today working against a successful military intervention. The domestic political climate in Greece today is stable. The Socialists won the 1981 election by a wide margin, and Papandreou's personal popularity remains high. Charges of fraud, which often accompanied elections in the 1960s, have not been leveled in elections since 1974, and issues which divided the country in the past—such as the fate of the monarchy and the

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legalization of the Communist Party—have been settled. If Papandreou sticks to his present course, we expect the Socialists to gain increased acceptance as a responsible party, in the process reducing uneasiness within the officer corps. Moreover, the last military intervention damaged the reputation of the officer corps so severely that we doubt any politician of standing today would lend his support to a coup. Without civilian support, an attempted intervention could turn into a bloody confrontation—a price we believe few officers would be willing to pay.

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In our view, the risks of military intervention should continue to decline over time. The military appears to be adopting an increasingly “neutral” position on political issues and in general becoming a more professional service. In the last analysis, the “depoliticization” of the military will depend, of course, on Greece’s acquiring the attributes of a modern Western state—strong democratic institutions, the commitment of both civilian and military leaders to work within the system, and a general belief in the fairness of the political process. Although many problems remain, Greece appears to be evolving gradually toward a pattern more in line with the West European norm. This trend, if it continues in the long run, will be the surest guarantee against the praetorian politics so prevalent in the past.

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